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The fifth annual Frontiers in Health Policy Research Conference, held
in Bethesda, Maryland, on June 7, 2001, brought together academic
economists and health policy experts from Washington, including re-
searchers, legislative staff, and government officials. The papers pre-
sented at that conference are gathered in this volume, which presents
impartial, cutting edge research that is directly relevant to contempo-
rary health policy debates.
Three papers focused on critical issues facing the Medicare program.
For many years, the adoption of capitated risk plans has been proposed
as a solution to many of Medicare's current and future problems.
Prominent Medicare reform proposals, such as the premium support
plan proposed by the Medicare Reform Commission, build on a foun-
dation of beneficiary choice among competing health plans. Capitated
plans are particularly attractive because they are expected to reduce
costs, coordinate care, and provide enhanced services to Medicare
beneficiaries. Such plans have been available for several years, some-
times under the name of Medicare risk plans or Medicare+Choice
plans. Despite the great hopes for such plans, the number of Medicare
beneficiaries who have enrolled in the plans has fallen far short of
expectations. In fact, in the wake of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
enrollment has decreased instead of increased. Although the disap-
pointing enrollment reflects in part a lack of demand by beneficiaries,
the well-publicized withdrawals of Medicare risk plans have also im-
peded the growth of capitation.
This impediment, according to Cawley, Chernew, and McLaughlin,
results directly from inadequate reimbursement. They estimate the
level of capitation payments necessary to make it profitable for
Medicare risk plans to be offered in a county Capitation payments mayxii Introduction
need to be particularly high in sparsely populated counties, but they
may also need to exceed current payment levels in other areas. Accord-
ing to the authors, premium payments in nearly 80 percent of the coun-
ties in their sample are now too low to support the availability of a
single Medicare managed-care plan.
Because it provides nearly universal health insurance for a large and
vulnerable segment of the U.S. population, Medicare would be ex-
pected to have large effects on the health and welfare of elderly and
disabled beneficiaries. Furthermore, because the largest group of
beneficiaries becomes eligible for Medicare simply by reaching their
sixty-fifth birthday, one would expect to see immediate changes in the
utilization of health services at age 65. Lichtenberg asks whether the
age proffles of utilization, morbidity, and mortality reveal that Medi-
care is having a great impact on health. His work reveals that the effects
of Medicare eligibility are not only detectable but surprisingly large.
The evidence he examines suggests that Medicare does increase the uti-
lization of medical services, as expected, and that this increaseduse is
associated with improved health outcomes.
Because evidence of market failure is ubiquitous, health care markets
are often cited as exceptions to general economic rules. One such ex-
ception may be competition among providers of health care. When
there are more hospitals in an area, can we expect lower prices for their
services? Since the hospitals may compete on quality as well as price,
do we observe measurably higher hospital quality in markets charac-
terized by a high level of competition? How would the answers to
these questions change when hospitals are compensated for a fixed fee
per admission (prospective payment), rather than receiving compensa-
tion for each service they provide? Meltzer and Chung note that earlier
studies reported competition may increase hospital costs when hospi-
tals are reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis, and it may have theop-
posite effect under prospective payment. These questions are critically
important for policies regarding hospital competition, which might ei-
ther raise or lower costs to Medicare and to consumers. The two au-
thors raise the possibility that under prospective payment, competition
might lower costs for patients who are unprofitable and raise costs for
patients who are profitable. They address this question by examining
data on hospital charges and cost-to-charge ratios from California in
two different years, one just before implementation of Medicare's Pro-
spective Payment System (1983), the other ten years later (1993) Clas-
sifying the degree of hospital competition within each county into fourIntroduction xiii
categories, and focusing on the twelve highest-volume diagnostic cate-
gories, they report that increased competition led to an increase in cost
growth in 1983 among the high-cost patients within these diagnoses,
but had the opposite effect among these high-cost Medicare bene-
ficiaries in 1993. They also find that cost reductions are largest for the
most expensive patients.
Under many plans to extend health insurance coverage to the unin-
sured, including the Bush administration's proposal, subsidies would
be used to enable the poor and the near-poor to purchase privatehealth
insurance. The subsidies would be administered in the form of refund-
able tax credits. One of the most controversial aspects of the tax credit
approach is the size of the tax credit that would be needed to achieve a
substantial increase in the number of Americans with health insurance.
According to some experts, only prohibitively large subsidies would
have the desired effect, but other work has shown that tax credits large
enough to cut health insurance premiums in half would also cut in half
the number of uninsured. Pauly, Herring, and Song address the effects
of tax credits by asking how a flat tax credit of $1,000 would affect net
premiums (individual market health insurance premiums minus the
subsidy) and the uptake of health insurance. Their work uses several
measures of net premiums to approximate moreclosely the premiums
that the target population of insurance nonpurchasers face, and they
estimate the distribution of insurance purchases based on the resulting
net premiums. In part because their measures ofpremium costs are
lower than those used in prior analyses, they find that the $1,000 tax
credit would result in a surprisingly large increase in insurance pur-
chases. A flat tax credit would do less for high-risk individuals than a
risk-adjusted tax credit, and there are many questions about the risk
proffle of the individuals who would begin to purchase insurance un-
der such a program. Depending on the risk proffles, as perceived by
health plans, the net premiums might be either lower or higher than
Pauly and his colleagues estimate.
The roles of for-profit and nonprofit institutions in health care con-
tinue to be hotly debated. Critics of for-profit hospitals and insurers ar-
gue that for-profit corporations provide lowerquality care, shun the
most vulnerable patients, and raise costs of health care. Criticsof
nonprofits argue that they are less efficient and provide lower quality
of care; another point of view holds that market competition forces
nonprofits and for-profits to behave in similar ways. To the extent that
for-profits and nonprofits behave differently, conversions between thexiv Introduction
two categories can have important welfare implications. Sloanargues
that recent increases in the for-profit share of hospitals, resulting from
hospital closings, mergers, and ownership changes, have the potential
to alter hospital performance. After reviewing the literatureon the rela-
tionship between hospital ownership and behavior, he analyzes data
on hospital conversions from 1988-1996 to determine whether
for-profit conversion affects the quality of care or costs. By examining
utilization and inpatient mortality for selected diseases, Sloan finds
that for-profit conversions are associated with reduced lengths ofstay,
but mortality remains unchanged. He also finds that pneumoniacom-
plication rates became more common after for-profit conversion.
Whether this finding is a signal of general problems with suchconver-
sions or whether this is an isolated result remains uncertain. However,
the study finds little other evidence of major effects of for-profitcon-
versions on outcomes.